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ABSTRACT 
 
Lauren Gaillard: Lowering the refugee death toll: An extent to which the EU has failed in 
the EU Turkey Joint Action Plan  
(Under the direction of Holger Moroff) 
 
 In this research I aim to unravel to what extent the EU has failed under the EU 
Turkey Agreement (JAP) to rightly lower the refugee death toll. I examine how the EU 
acts in its own self-interest, noting that saving the lives of refugees legally and illegally 
crossing its borders from the Eastern Mediterranean route is a contested moral, individual 
and institutional issue. There is an abstract and normative political responsibility the EU 
must uphold as an institution. Under Neo-institutionalism and the normative aims of R2P 
and the 1951 Geneva Convention I conclude that the EU in the EU Turkey deal 
superficially upholds its responsibility to lower the refugee death toll by fulfilling its 
duties under this policy for its political advantage. The failure is that the EU circumvents 
fixing the root causes of the issue by rerouting and increasing the death toll of refugees to 
the Central Mediterranean route. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, I aim to address the pressing issue surrounding unsafe refugee 
travel, specifically regarding the large number of deaths occurring on their journey to 
Europe as they migrate through different Mediterranean routes: Central and Eastern. By 
using the EU-Turkey JAP as a reference point, I will conclude that this particular deal has 
set a certain precedent, an extent to which has now currently called for a similar deal to 
be struck between North African countries and Europe. Several points of success outlined 
in the EU-Turkey agreement between Europe and Turkey, and three hypotheses centering 
around the failure on part of the EU in the EU-Turkey deal will be evaluated. The 
successes and failures depicted here thematically stem from a normative perspective, 
which revolve around the connection between morality and self-interest. I ask if it is 
possible for rational actors to act upon a policy out of self-interest and not address the 
‘root cause’ of the issue for which the policy is made. As such, the rational actor might be 
identified as ‘less’ moral, but here this is seen as not the case. I must first establish that 
this research firmly aims to suggest that the EU is a rational actor, which acts out of self-
interest under the EU Turkey deal and does in fact accomplish most of the issues that are 
laid out in the JAP.  
This insinuates that the JAP itself is not ‘amoral’; rather, it is the motive behind 
the actions and the miss-guidance of the EU in addressing a moral issue: lowering the 
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death toll of refugees. Therefore, I determine the following as given: the EU is a moral, 
rational actor, as there is no reason to believe otherwise; the EU Turkey deal is a valid 
policy and the EU carries out the majority of the goals outlined in the policy. The policy 
itself is neither ‘moral’ nor ‘amoral’, as it is a set of standards detailed for the EU and 
Turkey by which to abide. I argue that the motives and actions of the EU as a moral and 
rational actor, under the policy of the EU Turkey JAP, are somewhat ‘amoral’, as is 
defined here as the EU’s lack of addressing the root causes behind saving lives of 
refugees—supported statistically in the number of deaths that have continued to occur 
even after the implementation of the JAP.  
More explicitly, the main questions I address are: when evaluating the EU’s part 
in the EU Turkey deal, to what extent has the EU upheld its end of the deal, and in doing 
so, how has it succeeded or failed morally and statistically to save the lives of refugees? 
Furthermore, from the aid of other EU policies and mandates that deal with the migrant 
crisis and refugees, in what ways have they revealed the normative aims and political 
justifications of the EU when focusing on the individual and international institutional 
interests of lowering the death toll of refugees over time? The three hypotheses that may 
answer these questions include: 1) The EU as a moral, rational actor acts in its own self-
interest; 2) EU policy makers are less at fault than the EU as a greater institution for 
making a strategic deal with Turkey—one that makes lowering the death toll of refugees 
less of a priority 3) The EU upholds the main points of the EU Turkey JAP superficially, 
not fully solving the issue by neglecting the root causes of mass refugee deaths in the 
Mediterranean sea, specifically centering around Syrian Civil War.  
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I will conclude from this that the EU acting out of self-interest only delegitimizes 
its morale when acting under the JAP in this humanitarian crisis; it is not delegitimized 
completely as an institution. When a rational institution outlines a policy that does not 
explicitly address the root cause of a moral issue it aims to achieve overall, but rather 
uses strategic self-interest and coercive means to just make improvements of the situation 
on the surface, then it might succeed at upholding the points of the deal and yet still fail 
at properly addressing the issue directly. This suggests that in this research the EU 
conducted ‘amoral’ actions as a moral and rational institution. An actor only uses the 
construction and implementation of a policy as a vessel to prove whether its motives and 
actions are thus out of self-interest and moral or not.  
Quantitative data from EU Fact Sheets, FRONTEX Reports, IOM statistics, etc. 
shows factual evidence as to how a deal like the EU-Turkey agreement is not adequately 
combating the core issue of stopping refugees from dying on their journey to Europe—
that in this aspect, it is failing as a deal because it is simply rerouting the occurrences of 
refugee deaths. I point out qualitatively that the EU-Turkey deal has not been explicitly 
successful in taking measures to save refugees’ lives by using EU legislative documents, 
fact sheets and press releases from 2015 to 2017, an article from BBC, as well as 
secondary sources of literature for reference. Through these methods of research, I find 
that there is a difference between actively saving refugees’ lives as they continue to cross 
the borders of the EU and rather simply stopping the passage of refugees across the 
Mediterranean by striking a deal to limit the number of travelers and strengthen 
restrictions for travel—claiming that this is successful in ‘lowering the death toll’—
showing the EU’s self-interest motives.  
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As I examine the EU and migrant crisis in more detail through the lens of a neo-
institutional framework and a 3-part normative angle, it is clear that though there is a 
responsibility to protect by many nations other than the EU, it is due to the international, 
neo-institutional and political nature of the EU in relation to the routes refugees are 
taking that it makes most sense to analyze, for the purposes of this research, only the 
EU’s responsibility to protect. The analysis will consist of deciphering the conundrum of 
who’s ‘higher standards’ the EU on the macro and micro level uses when responding to 
the crisis, and the moral and rational normative aims that may have guided the EU to act.  
To first point out, the position the EU is in is very unique with respect to its role 
as a supranational entity because alongside of its responsibility to protect under the 
political commitment RtoP (or R2P), EU member states also have a commitment to abide 
by the Geneva Convention, specifically the 1951 Refugee Convention. The ideological 
issue is based on the overall purpose of the EU Turkey JAP, which is its commitment to 
first saving the lives of refugees. The EU rather aims to achieve other goals that instead 
benefit the EU (and Turkey) paving the way for further, similar deals to be made (several 
of which will be mentioned later as supporting or resulting from the EU Turkey 
agreement). In part, I research certain points highlighted in the EU Turkey deal and 
expose how the EU is benefiting and what this may mean for current and future 
agreements and partnerships.  
 
1.1 The EU Turkey Agreement (Joint Action Plan) 
 Due to the massive developments of the Syrian war, the migrant crisis escalated to 
a point where the EU had to respond, making this a root cause of the migrant crisis and 
5 
 
refugee deaths. In recent years there has been one of the largest number of refugees to 
cross over the borders into the EU. Legal and illegal, refugees continue to flee from the 
Middle East and Africa using several possible routes and means of travel; however, the 
most popular pathways have shifted from the Eastern Mediterranean route to the Central 
Mediterranean route since the implementation of the JAP. The biggest issue for the EU is 
its incapability to stop the large amount of deaths from occurring, specifically in the 
Mediterranean ocean. As is hypothesized, the EU has failed to make lowering the death 
toll a first priority. Initially it was in 2013 that the EU said it would actually make it a 
priority to spearhead "increase [d] engagement with third countries in order to avoid that 
migrants embark on hazardous journeys towards the European Union…”1. The EU 
further tried to exemplify morale by concluding in 2015 after the extraordinarily large 
loss of lives in the shipwreck near Lampedusa, that they would "mobilise all efforts at its 
disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human 
emergency" and then “strengthen their presence at sea.”2 There is a point of contention 
resting upon the question as to how we should interpret the last aim written in this line: 
‘to tackle the root causes of the human emergency’.  
 Ultimately, the root causes revolve around the concept of war. It is due to war that 
there has been an escalation in refugee flight from cultural and political persecution. An 
aim of the EU is to establish partnerships, deals and political relationships with its 
                                                            
1 See Appendix 3, 2b. Legislative Document, p.2; 
Source from reference 2; primary source from COM (2015) final of 13.5.2015 
2 See Appendix 3, 2b. Legislative Document, p.2; 
Primary source: European Council conclusions of December 2016. See the Valletta Political 
Declaration and Action Plan. The next step in the process will be a Senior Officials Meeting on 8-
9 February. 
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neighboring countries to maintain cooperative and peaceful environments.  If there is war 
amongst its neighboring countries, causing refugee flight into Europe then that root cause 
to be addressed is war. The EU is currently exploring different options to aid the crisis 
such as focusing on the containment of traffickers and stopping the smuggling business. 
This does not stop the root cause of the issue, and therefore does not prevent refugees 
from coming into the EU (Kempin and Sheler, 2015).  
Former military operations led by the US and NATO in several countries across 
North Africa and the Middle East resulted in their regime changes, civil wars and 
economic disparity. These in fact are several root causes that initiated the migrant crisis. 
As Chossudovsky states, “The refugee crisis is triggered by the despair of millions of 
people fleeing their homeland, whose lives have been destroyed as a result of [US led] 
wars and civil wars coupled with devastating macro-economic reforms imposed by ‘The 
Washington Consensus’ (Chossudovsky, 2016).” Outlined clearly by EU legislation is 
that their “first priority remains saving the lives of those attempting to cross the 
Mediterranean in their path towards Europe.” They also believe that “the root causes, in 
particular conflict, political violence, abuse of human rights and poverty, is essential.3’ 
These objectives are prioritized like so, are however, not upheld by the EU under the EU 
Turkey agreement the way in which it is phrased here.  
It was on 29 November 2015 that the EU activated the Joint Action Plan, which 
came from the European Agenda on Migration on 15 October 2015.4 The JAP notes 
several key ways in which both Turkey and the EU will join together in partnership and 
                                                            
3 See Appendix 3, 2a. Legislative Document. In the document this quote comes from section II 
under “The European Union’s policy framework and response.” 
 
4 See Appendix 3, 1. Press Release p.2 
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try, “…to step up their cooperation on support of Syrians under temporary protection and 
migration management in a coordinated effort to address the crisis created by the 
situation in Syria5.” This shows that the EU has good moral and humanistic intensions to 
make it a priority to save refugee lives but in planning and implementation there was a 
failure. For example, the fault was not on the EU for the shipwreck but for the EU to 
make a statement in 2013 to put in a collaborative effort to detour refugees from taking 
hazardous journeys and then two years later there be a mass death occurrence of refugees 
who took an unsafe method of travel, sheds light on the lack of attention the EU put on 
tackling the root causes of the crisis.   
 Over time there have been overall successes, several of which do point to the 
implementation of the EU Turkey JAP in this ‘step up’ in coordination; however, some 
success also occurred in the interest of the EU. 1) The EU has less migrants crossing their 
borders while Turkey has kept the majority, increasing the number of refugees Turkey 
must politically support; 2) Turkey benefited from monetary aid the EU has given but 
they are still left with more of a burden to take care of the refugees; 3) The EU convened 
with Turkey to make this joint deal but under the EU’s provision. It is written in the JAP 
Press Release as such: “The implementation of the Action Plan will be jointly steered and 
overseen by the European Commission and the High Representative / Vice President and 
the Turkish government through the establishment of the EU-Turkey high-level working 
group on migration.6” This automatically gives more leeway to the EU, leaving Turkey at 
a bit of a disadvantage even before negotiating. With this, the EU Turkey JAP initially 
                                                            
5 See Appendix 3, 4. EU Turkey Fact Sheet  
6 See Appendix 3, 4. EU Turkey Joint Action Plan Fact Sheet 
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exposes many underlying issues and yet successful measures as well, both for the EU and 
Turkey; however, what can be concluded and further examined is the extent to which the 
EU has failed to uphold its responsibilities in the EU Turkey agreement and how the 
agreement has somewhat failed itself on a deeper level through the theoretical lens of 
neo-institutionalism.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Neo-Institutionalism 
 Institutionalism is a part of organization theory in which many scholars depict 
institutional conception and reasoning as institutions having cultural, normative and 
regulative elements (Scott, 2001). There is a spectrum within this new-institutionalist 
way of thinking where the most constructivist part of the continuum, from scholars like 
John Meyer, emphasize social creation of actors where it is believed that the environment 
is what shapes institutions and organizations. At the other end of this continuum, there are 
sets of ‘institutional constraints and supports’ of those pursuing self-determined interests 
in the process co-creating institutions. The first would be more along the lines of a kind 
of neo-institutionalism that the EU follows in its actions within the international 
community. It was in the 1970s and 1980s that new institutionalism came to the forefront 
of the theoretical scene, shifting attention from ‘old’ institutionalism in order to highlight 
that there may in fact be outside environmental factors that affect the constructs of 
organizations and give them ideas for their structure, increasing their legitimacy globally. 
“As put by DiMaggio and Powell (1991:8): ‘The new institutionalism in organization 
theory and sociology comprises a rejection of rational-actor models, an interest in 
institutions as independent variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations, 
and an interest in properties of supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to 
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aggregations or direct consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives’ (Bromley and 
Powell, 2013).” 
 There is, however, an issue within neo-institutionalism, the rejection of self-interest 
and the global legitimization of institutions. It is problematic in a way to say that the EU 
has delegitimized itself under this theory if one abstractly blames them as an actor with 
selfish motives to respond to the migrant crisis of course. There is an issue of morality—
detecting where these ‘higher standards’ and ‘higher forms of legitimization’ come from 
and who creates them. It is difficult to pin down from whom and where these higher 
‘moral’ and political standard originate. The issue of ‘higher standards’ and the actions of 
individuals in connection to the institutional processes are more in line with Zucker’s 
social psychological outlook (Zucker, 1997). This conceptualization of neo-
institutionalism constitutes that there is an emphasis on more of the micro-foundational 
side where the individual is greatly connected, either by influencing or being influenced, 
by institutions. 
 Regarding individual influence by institutions, it is also vital to recognize that at 
such an individual political level, there is almost no choice but for politicians to adhere to 
a rejection of their own political motives. For example, if a large number of the electorate 
from EU member states perceive that helping refugees is not in their own self-interest, or 
in the interest of the EU, then would it not be true that politicians who ignore them will 
not be (re-) elected? However, this is not the case for highly politicized humanitarian 
issues like the migrant crisis. From an abstract institutional level, the motives of the 
politicians at a supraindividual level do become more of a focus than at an individual 
level. This is true considering that individual motives come together to become 
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supraindividual and thus can end up institutionalized. In the co-creation of greater 
institutions or in the creation and implementation of policies and deals like the EU 
Turkey deal, under neo-institutionalism when an institution does not reject their own self-
determined interests, one can in fact ‘appropriate aggregations and consequences’ to the 
greater institution’s actions. This leads us to question the motives of the EU as an 
institution. The EU has pursued its own interests and is consequentially failing to perform 
the duty of saving refugee’s lives through a deal that in theory it was supposed to 
accomplish; yet, instead the deal became a bargaining tool for EU border security and 
thus reduced entry of illegal migrants into the EU.  
 On the contrary, the EU does uphold certain concepts of neo-institutionalism. Due 
to the need for international responses of refugees in Europe, this humanitarian issue can 
be seen as an outside, environmental influence in the global polity, requiring a collective 
international response to initiate an expansion of empowering individuals and national 
institutions to come together.  On the surface, the EU has indeed continued to respond 
from outside environmental factors, i.e. the Migrant Crisis, thus following the nature of 
neo-institutionalism. They have and are diffusing the practice of nationalized 
organization to international organization where rational-actors and their interests are 
governed by a ‘wider institutional environment’. The EU Turkey deal can therefore be 
categorized as a modernized form of rationalized administration from both the EU and 
Turkey’s side in a linkage to world society. This emphasizes that there exists a world 
polity which acts out of world societal influences, allowing international bodies to work 
together under a new kind of institutionalization, one that is cohesively pursues collective 
interests and not separate ones (Bromley and Powell, 2013).  
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2.2 Challenges  
 Two concerns that Powell and Bromley mention are also two concerns within 
researching normative and political motivations for the EU to form a deal with Turkey. 
The first challenge under the neo-institutional framework is that some attest to the fact 
that formal structures are superficial and that relative to actual practices, are tackling a 
peripheral issue. In this instance, this would allude to the EU tackling the peripheral issue 
of ‘lowering refugee deaths’ but actually not getting to the root causes of the issues. Neo-
institutionalism overlooks addressing the overspecialization of actors —the EU (and 
Turkey as well)—and a lack of attention to coercive power (the EU coercing Turkey to 
abide by their end of the deal in order to receive benefits specified in this deal, such as 
reevaluation of Turkey’s accession into the EU and providing them monetary support in 
order for the EU to retain ‘border security’ and less refugee entries). It cannot be ignored 
that Turkey also uses refugees as a bargaining chip with the EU to make them acquiesce 
to the authoritarian regime they are trying to establish. The second challenge is that some 
interpret the emphasis on diffusion and homogeneity of organizational structures as 
having an influence from modernity and rationalization, thus appearing to become 
increasingly ‘superficially similar’ (Bromley and Powell, 2013).     
 Conclusively, how can high normative aims such as R2P still be pursued, even 
under a mandate—the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention—in a co-created policy like the 
EU Turkey deal (when it is apparent that institutions on a macro-scale) have underlying 
self-interests? This conundrum leads to the question, how high can normative aims like 
R2P still be pursued in democracies even if they are in conflict with public opinion or 
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possibly, and as is seen today, give rise to radical parties? Politicians have to walk a fine 
line when voicing their own opinions and motives in public, or at the electorate 
supraindividual and institutional levels. Looking further into the normative aims of R2P 
and with respect to the Geneva Convention and a more psychological thought-provoking 
section, this conundrum may connect the individual actor, the international and 
institutional organizations and moral ‘high standards’ seen in the affects of the EU Turkey 
deal.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
 As a means for collecting data, I used mixed methods in this research. The 
quantitative data is used to provide mathematical models that are able to the issues in 
number of refugee deaths, arrivals and routes taken over the time that occurred before 
and during the EU Turkey deal was conceived and implemented. In order to put the 
mathematical data to use, qualitative data was collected, some from the same sources. I 
introduced the qualitative data involuntarily, as the premise of this research incorporated 
the necessity of finding primary documents, first by searching for documented evidence 
on the EU Turkey deal but then also the theoretical support and legislative writings to 
factually explain and support the argument at hand. Due to this research’s case-based 
nature, it was necessary to provide legislative grounding for a comparison over time on 
how legislative implementation and the EU Turkey deal, along with supplementary 
mandates and deals, affected or related to the increase or decrease in the death toll of 
refugees.  
 The quantitative data I collected comes from various Internet based sources. Some 
data comes from secondary sources such as articles or brief reports from institutes such as 
the Migration Policy Institute. Other quantitative data was retrieved from Frontex Report 
Analyses or data collection and analysis organizations such as IOM and GMDAC, along 
side primary source documents like EU Summit publishings or EEAS Fact sheets.  
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 There are limitations and biases, however. An issue with these documents is the 
recognition that the sources are all from a one-sided (EU) perspective. Neither Turkish 
nor African sources were used within the confines of this research. Even still, using such 
international documents were arguably not necessary to support the research presented 
here, which centered around faulting the EU for not upholding its morale in the EU 
Turkey deal. Such conclusions can still be made by using EU documents, reports and 
websites.  
 Also, having various kinds of data sources has advantages and disadvantages. 
Advantages include that there are a variety of primary and secondary sources pointing to 
the same conclusion, adding more legitimacy to my argument. This quantitative variety 
however still brings about disadvantages, including that some data aimed at measuring 
the same topics were collected over sets of different years of comparison. For example, 
data collected in 2015 and 2016 might only have figures and tables that compare data of 
those years (or from several years before, like 2012), while updated data of 2016 or 2017 
show comparisons between only those two years. This is an issue with researching a 
contemporary and current topic—the data available is somewhat limited and covers 
smaller ranges and sets of time, as well as smaller aspects of comparison.  
 Primary sources such as EU published documents add the advantage of reliability 
and regular updates; however, this also has its limitations. As is true when researching 
such a current policy issue, new proposals and deals are consistently being formed and 
reformed, making it difficult to focus on specific ways in which, in this case, the EU 
decides to combat a core issue within one policy. For example, when the EU held the 
Malta Summit in February of 2017, the issue focused on was consistent with the EU 
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Turkey JAP and the safety of refugees. However, the combatant methods to tackle this 
issue were shifted from focusing on the terms of the EU Turkey deal to smugglers and the 
prevention of unsafe methods of illegal migrant crossings, specifically along the coast of 
Libya and other North African countries. Ways of tackling the refugee death toll are 
changing; there are two upsides to this.  
 One is that this helps verify the issue that the EU Turkey deal does not necessarily 
do a just job at putting the lives of refugees first and actually reducing refugee deaths. It 
just pushes the refugees to go to other locations through dangerous land routes or to the 
coast of Libya where they take on the deadly waters of the Mediterranean and end up 
dying in even larger numbers. This supports the argument that refugees overall are still 
dying under the EU Turkey deal even though they may have reduced the number of 
deaths along the Eastern Mediterranean route. Therefore, this identifies that the EU 
Turkey deal is a legislative and political means for the EU to say it has done its 
humanitarian job while ultimately acting in its own interests by securing its borders and 
subsiding continued refugee migration into the EU.  
 Secondly, this research comes from various updated documents that are consistently 
changing. What once was a priority topic to be addressed in the EU Turkey deal, has now 
turned into a deal on its own. Arguably, lowering of the refugee death toll is no longer at 
the top of the agenda for the EU Turkey deal; it has become the primary agenda between 
the EU and North African countries. This in a way delegitimizes the argument presented 
in this paper considering that now there are more measures being taken and deals being 
made in order to address the root causes and humanitarian issues of the migrant crisis. 
This shows that there are policies that somewhat do seem to put the lives of refugees at 
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the core of their proposal, perhaps even revealing that the psychological and theoretical 
groundings used in this research may be discussed from a skewed angle—now revealing 
an alternative, that EU policy makers may psychologically understand the gravity of the 
large death toll and that the EU as a supranational entity may not be as worried about 
border security as it is about saving the lives of refugees. But of course, these 
counterarguments are hypothetical.  
 One brief additional limitation is that in some quantitative and actually qualitative 
data, it is difficult to decipher if the number of deaths include other methods of travel. 
The primary focus of this research is to detect the number of deaths by sea but also to 
allude to the fact that more should be done overall to ensure the total amount of deaths 
even on land and air, now within these African countries too, are reduced or fully 
subsided.  
 
3.2 Data Analysis 
 The aforementioned overlapping of qualitative and quantitative data is increasingly 
evident as the research proceeds. Intertwined are the qualitative documents and primary 
sources, alongside the quantitative mathematical figures and tables. The figures, table and 
primary documents are all inserted in the appendices of this research paper in order to 
allow for contextual flow and a clearer understanding of how legislative documents and 
fact sheets naturally draw upon quantitative data. This better allows the EU perspective to 
be the focus and shows in which ways these documents may support or negate what the 
quantitative data reveals. The concluding argument of this research will be exposed once 
the analysis has been made. 
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 I first and primarily evaluate in this research the qualitative data of the EU 
legislative document on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council: Migration on the Central Mediterranean Route 
Managing flows, saving lives from 25 January 2017. Additionally using further primary 
and some secondary qualitative data sources, truths and falsehoods are recognized in a 
correlated manner between the ways in which the EU qualitatively adheres to its 
agreements and deals in the JAP, and also how it quantitatively reduces the death toll of 
refugees. I remark from the data that there is a rising focus on the implementation of a 
similar deal between the EU and North African countries.  
 It was after December 2013 that the plan to build a stronger policy and response to 
help migrants avoid hazardous journeys to Europe was initiated. According to the 
European Council, it became a priority. This ‘priority’ gained recognition and kept this 
status as the EU took on an unprecedented role being a supranational body to develop 
such response mechanisms to the tragedies that were occurring and would soon become a 
pinnacle number of refugee deaths in history. In 2015 one of the most devastating 
accidents, the shipwreck near Lampedusa, caused thousands of refugee deaths. The EU 
made a call to respond, which solidified the notion that they would “tackle the root causes 
of the human emergency by strengthening [their] presence at sea (2).7” This recently 
published legislative document further states that since this tragedy, the EU has kept a 
strong presence indeed in the Mediterranean, rescuing tens of thousands of lives through 
today.  
                                                            
7 See Appendix 3, 2b. Legislative Document 
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 Even still, there have been negotiations and new deals thrown on the table for the 
EU to work with the Libyan Coast Guard and instill a Partnership Framework with 
several countries along the African transit route. It is therefore noticeable how the EU has 
now recognized that the efforts to simply create a ‘stronger presence at sea’ has not 
stopped the issue of refugees still crossing the Mediterranean, allowing for deaths to 
continue to occur. Sure, we see that the European Council has increased efforts to save 
the lives of refugees, but made known publicly at the 2017 Malta Summit by President 
Junker, migrant deaths have increased along the Central Mediterranean route since 2015. 
Put in other terms, this hints at a problem of this deal: migrants, mainly Syrian refugees, 
are still trying to escape and are dying, doing so by using other routes and illegal 
measures like smuggling to cross the Mediterranean into Europe because of the 
circumvention of the EU to address the root causes of refugee deaths.  
 Taking a deeper look into the data, I find further limitations with two outcomes, one 
with a negative affect and one with a positive affect. Firstly, certain data only depicts the 
sea crossings and the number of deaths occurring over the Mediterranean in relation to 
the number of refugees (mostly illegal) who continue to leave the Turkish and North 
African coastlines to cross. This is limiting, so in order to get a more accurate number of 
refugee deaths over time, it would be most beneficial to look at data that shows the ratio 
between the number of all refugees, legal and illegal, who have left to cross into the EU 
before and after the agreement’s implementation and then look at the number of deaths 
that occurred both before and after said agreement was put in place. It is then that one 
would have a most accurate number and correlation to see if this agreement affected the 
death toll. Furthermore, one would have to determine these numbers for each migration 
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route separately and combined to better find if the deal was ‘a success’ in saving lives. In 
addition to this, it would be necessary to take into account the means of transportation 
and then look at the rates of death within the countries refugees travel through in order to 
get to their destination country, regardless if it’s to the EU, Africa or the Middle East. 
Numbers of this caliber are almost impossible to 100% account for. Because of this, and 
because of the data limitations of this research, there may in fact be bias and skewed data.   
 It would be necessary to look at numbers of refugees specifically who legally and 
illegally crossed the Eastern Mediterranean route from the coast (or by land or air) of 
Turkey into the EU and compare that with the number of legal and illegal refugees who 
travelled the Central Mediterranean route from the coastline (or by land or air) into the 
EU. This would need to be done perhaps from 2014 until the implementation of the EU 
Turkey JAP and then again from the implementation date up through today. This would 
ultimately provide a more accurate, less biased and overall explanation as to if this deal 
effectively, all around reduced the death toll of refugees. The morale of this deal of 
course cannot mathematically be accounted for. This will have to fall under the category 
of qualitative normative perceptions of determining this aspect of efficacy or by figuring 
out if the EU dutifully upheld its responsibility to protect, doing so under good, selfless 
intentions. 
 Quantitative data from the EEAS fact sheet further suggests that the EU decided to 
establish relations and make proposals for agreements and deals with their African 
neighbors, e.g. the EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sofia, EUBAM and the new approach of 
the Migration Partnership Framework, which rethinks how all concerned actors – the 
European Union’s Member States, the EU institutions, and third countries – [will] work 
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together to better manage migration flows and strive for well-managed migration.8 The 
EU wants to solidify its African relations to continue its endeavor in responding to the 
‘human emergency’ as a priority. So, for the different EU institutions and leaders there-
within, it is necessary to extend humanitarian responses of the migrant crisis toward 
further assisting other countries along the central route that are a part of this international 
challenge. Further expressed by two main leaders in the EU are statements that push for a 
stronger European international presence in order to create win-win partnerships, 
ultimately instilling the belief that this will help address the root causes of the refugee 
crisis9. 
“A lasting solution will only come if we address the root causes, the reasons why we are 
currently facing this important refugee crisis. Our European foreign policy must be more 
assertive.”  
-Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission 
 
“Migration is a positive thing for the world, but we need to do it in a regulated way. It is a 
global, complex phenomenon, it concerns the EU as much as countries of transit or origin 
...Our approach is a new one, based on a win-win partnership.”  
-Federica Mogherini, High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission, 
Strasbourg – 7 June 2016 
 
 In light of examining more data limitations and analyses, one must not be fooled. 
These views come out of privilege and from a feeling or manner of ‘success’ they believe 
they have achieved with Turkey in reducing the number of refugee deaths since the deal 
was implemented10. This, however, only accounts for one mode of transit—sea—from the 
Central African route. As such, it is difficult to project and make solid statements on the 
efficacy of the EU’s policies to lower the death toll. However, this limitation allows us to 
                                                            
8 See Appendix 3, 3. EEAS Fact Sheet 
9 See Appendix 3, 3. EEAS Fact Sheet, p.1 
10 See Appendix 1, Figure 1 
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continue to examine the research in another way. I now must ask why the EU has been 
refraining so far to stop the death toll on land too. Is it because of sovereignty? Is it out of 
respect for these Middle Eastern and African countries in their partnership framework to 
authoritatively take care of its people? Or is this fully or partly out of EU self-interest? If 
the EU can only legally—without permission—save the lives of refugees at sea due to its 
right by international law, then this is understandable. But it is due to this establishment 
of new frameworks and partnerships between the EU and Turkey or North African 
countries that shows how the EU can and will circumvent its involuntary duty to abide by 
international regulations in order to continue to establish plans that harness its presence 
and personal interests to extend its borders internationally and avoid addressing the crisis 
head-on. 
 Secondly, the data for the number of refugee deaths across the Mediterranean ocean 
along the Central route is not misleading and stands for itself, revealing that there has 
undoubtedly been an increase in the death toll and in illegal migration since the 
implementation of the EU Turkey deal. The numbers of migratory travelers, legal or 
illegal, from North Africa to Italy along the Central Mediterranean route may have risen 
in comparison to that of the Eastern route due to the containment of refugees in Turkey—
as was proposed in the EU-Turkey deal in exchange for financial support from the EU.11 
The number of migrants crossing EU borders in general has decreased, especially along 
the Eastern route, which was the predominate route of irregular migration since 201212 
(Katsiaficas, 2016). It is because of this reduced border crossing that the EU sees the 
                                                            
11 See Table 1 –Appendix 2 
12 See Appendix 1, Figure 2 
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need for a similar deal with North Africa. Just because one deal may have subsided the 
number of migrants crossing EU borders, does not mean that the EU is saving the lives of 
refugees because of this. Factually, the implementation of the EU Turkey deal has caused 
a spike in refugee deaths due to its deterring nature. If they make another deal with North 
African countries to combat such reduced EU border crossings, then track record shows 
that refugees will just move and use another route, no matter the dangerous conditions. 
 The data provided also either only examines the Eastern route from Turkey to 
Greece only or the Central route from North Africa (Libya mostly) to Italy. In the specific 
Grecian EU point of entry, it may be due to causal factors including, time of migration—
noting that the decrease occurred recently after the EU Turkey deal was established and 
also that the months examined were over the Winter season, thus making refugees less 
likely to travel in such cold waters and weather conditions13. Ironically, this season is the 
time when most refugees decided to leave North Africa to travel to the EU. “In 2016, 
migrants embarked on trips from North Africa across the Mediterranean more frequently 
in winter months, as indicated by the 49,393 arrivals to Italy in October–December 2016, 
compared to only 21,772 in the same period in 2015, and 31,304 in 2014 (GMDAC, 
2016).” 
 
 
  
                                                            
13 See Appendix 1, Figure 3 
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CHAPTER 4: NORMATIVE AIMS 
Introduction 
 In general, points of failure are viewed differently when approaching an 
evaluation from a normative perspective. As such, there are several ways in which one 
could normatively assess the failure of the EU to rightly lower the refugee death toll 
under the EU Turkey JAP. However, considering it is evident that this deal has been 
conceived under the management of the EU, I normatively assess motives and reasoning 
of the EU from an institutional level by looking at their actions under R2P and the 
Geneva Convention. I will also examine the actions and motivations of individuals, such 
as policy makers and politicians further on from a psychoanalytical perspective to better 
interpret how one can or cannot comprehend mass deaths. This would hint at a more 
concrete idea of perhaps why getting to the root cause of the issue and of coming up with 
an effective plan to combat the death toll might be difficult.  
In 2016 the Migrant Crisis State of Play Agenda given by the European 
Commission, listed twelve priority actions as ‘matters of urgency’. Several actions listed 
here and carried out by the EU included distributing aid to Turkey and Syrian Refugees in 
order to tend to their needs within Turkey. The Implementation Report states, “The aim of 
the measure is to make Turkey a more attractive asylum country for Syrians addressing 
thus one of the main factors pushing Syrians to cross irregularly to the EU in search of 
better perspectives14.” This opens the door for asking about motives and the ideology 
                                                            
14 See Appendix 3, 1. Legislative Document p.1  
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behind the EU extending help across its borders to admittedly keep refugees in Turkey. It 
calls out refugees leaving Turkey for the EU, saying that they envision the EU as a better 
place, in search of that ‘better perspective’.  
Such a statement by the EU uncovers a slightly self-centered sense of political 
and economic awareness in comparison to where refugees are coming from, and lacks the 
selfless acknowledgement of the cultural and security challenges refugees face when 
crossing over the Mediterranean into the EU. From a documented standpoint the EU even 
first thinks of itself before and during its philanthropic actions to save lives. However, 
here they are admitting that there are pull factors, which is not a bad or amoral thing to 
do; the pull factors consist of: a better livelihood, safety, adequate means of food, shelter 
and basic needs, as well as the potential to stay in countries that are not ridden with war. 
In one respect it is necessary for the EU to mention the pull factors, but what might be 
depreciating the value of this statement in the report is the lack of addressing the root 
causes, the push factors, such as the initial cause of the migrant crisis—war. 
 The EU Turkey agreement also seems to flash this inward approach by 
decentralizing the focus of humanitarian response from the greater international complex 
of intervention based on adherence to the Geneva Convention and R2P regarding saving 
the lives of refugees, to a more nationalized complex of advocating for national elections 
and gaining right- or left-wing political support—mainly within EU member states. It is 
necessary to first look at how there is more of a responsive action instead of a 
preventative action being taken by the EU, which is indeed seen detailed in the JAP as 
well as in other reports and mandates mentioned here for supplemented reasoning. Such 
additional documentation includes the European Commission’s 2016 Implementation 
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Report on managing the migrant crisis. This leads us to take a closer look at the 
ideological reasoning for intervention in order to then analyze the facts on illegal 
migration, the death toll and the number of arrivals into the EU pre and post the 
implementation of the EU Turkey JAP.  
 Almost arbitrary yet documented information that sets up another normative 
approach reveals how the EU acts more out of personal interest as a rational-actor, 
skirting around addressing the root issue of migrant deaths. For example, in 2016 the EU 
partly blamed weather conditions for the overall increase in the death toll. “It has also to 
be noted that, due to deteriorating weather conditions, the number of people who perished 
while irregularly crossing to Greece is on the rise.15” While this may be in fact true, what 
is missing here is the reasoning as to why in the first place refugee migrants felt the need 
to escape in such dangerous conditions knowing that they may possibly die. Perhaps it is 
due to their need to desperately escape whatever situation they are in, the Syrian Civil 
War for instance, knowing that if they stay they may die anyway. So, maybe they think, 
why not just die trying to at least make it to safety in Europe? If the EU understood and 
responded to the root causes of this humanitarian crisis, perhaps this legislative document 
would not need to blame weather for refugee deaths. Instead maybe the EU could have, at 
that time, called for safer measures for refugees to enter Europe.  
 It is true however that the EU is responding to the crisis in Syria by inducing 
political solutions and not military ones. This comes after the reoccurrence of violent acts 
after the deemed cessation of fighting and US-Russian hostilities in Syria. The EU is 
giving neighboring Syrian countries financial and humanitarian assistance and is 
                                                            
15 See Appendix 3, 1. Legislative Document p.5 
 
27 
 
suspending its cooperation with the Syrian government under the ENP. Does this now 
suggest that they are acting out of morale as a legitimate institutional organization? They 
are helping by actively participating in the ISSG, fully supporting the UN’s efforts of the 
UN Special Envoy for Syria, and most importantly, pushing the notion that “stability in 
Syria will only be restored through a Syrian-led political process leading to a peaceful 
and inclusive transition, based on the principles of the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 
2012...ready to provide support once political transition has started (The EU and the 
Crisis in Syria, 2016).” The EU now addresses the root causes of war but only sticks to 
providing humanitarian aid, waiting for Syria to properly politically transition. The EU 
expresses concerns about foreign non-state actors and military involvement but ultimately 
does not spearhead the solutions of war. Anxiously, everyone waits for the war to be over 
while the EU continues humanitarian assistance. Of course aiding in such crises is moral 
and important, which is what the EU is doing, but is this actually saving lives and solving 
the issue?  
Concluded in this report as well as in the aforementioned Malta Summit is that the 
EU is sending in military-type support like the Frontex coast guard to cooperate with the 
Libyan coast guard along the African coasts and they are also trying to assist in the 
efforts with Turkey to prevent illegal migration. However, the EU is addressing the 
affects of the root causes and hoping that the root issue will die down with the response 
and peace tactics they have implemented. What is the right answer? What is the moral 
thing to do—intervene directly, using hard power to stop the war, addressing the root 
cause of the deaths of refugees, or continue making deals trying to prevent illegal 
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migrants from traveling across EU borders, strategically bargaining under their self-
interests? 
We should understand that refugees come no matter the conditions; therefore, 
should the EU not address the root cause of unpreventable migration by enacting safe-
travel as a prevention method to stop refugee deaths? Bridging the gap between the 
normative perspective and policy making, how should the EU then make a deal with 
Turkey, upholding their duty to respond out of adherence to the UN’s mandate, doing so 
without making their personal political agenda a priority? Morally, should they help 
Turkey and continue to do whatever is necessary to save the lives of refugees even if that 
includes helping them safely cross dangerous waters—doing so instead of blaming their 
actions and number of refugee deaths on the weather and methods of travel?  Of course, 
if the EU does open their borders and reach out to take on the responsibility to bring 
migrants over, this could introduce many issues culturally, socially, politically and 
geographically. Security issues would be of priority and existing citizens’ livelihoods 
could feel threatened, politically this might be even more time-consuming for asylum 
applications, relocation, Schengen countries and EU mandates versus national member 
states’ law. So, how far the EU’s responsibility go to protect? 
 
4.1 Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) 
 The first political responsibility through which I assess the EU under the JAP is 
the Responsibility to Protect. Certain questions based on the foundation that members of 
the UN agreed to the R2P political commitment therefore come into play. Which 
members did or did not respond to this crisis, and if they did, in what ways were they 
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efficient and open-minded in doing so? Keeping these questions in mind, it is very 
important to point out that I unfortunately will not compare other countries’ mobility in 
stepping up and extending aid as the EU has in this research. It is quite noticeable that the 
EU has taken the brunt of the refugee migration crisis since the civil war in Syria broke 
out, so they still deserve to be commended for the rapid work and policy implementations 
they have achieved thus far.  
After accounting for the timely response of the EU, under Pillar two, 
International Assistance and capacity-building in the Responsibility to Protect mandate, 
it is clear that the UN has promoted the means of coercion and suasion, as is so elegantly 
put in the report of the Secretary General.16 This promotion of suasion generates the 
notion that R2P is based more on deals and personal connections that two or more 
national or international communities make with one another, so long as they appropriate 
and encourage states to exercise their responsibility to protect.17 Where is the lawful and 
legal legitimacy here? The Summit Outcome, which is what outlined this mandate R2P, 
states in paragraphs 138 and 139 four forms of provision. This report highlights that the 
first form of assistance implies “persuading States to do what they ought to do” while the 
others actually, “suggest mutual commitment and an active partnership between the 
international community and the State”18.  
                                                            
16 See Appendix 3, 6. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Report of the Secretary 
General p.15 
 
17 See Appendix 3, 6. p.15 
18 See Appendix 3, 6. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Report of the Secretary 
General para. 28, p.15 
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 The kind of assistance asked of States in the international community is exactly 
what the EU is doing, as well as Turkey and potentially the North African countries—
adhering to a somewhat mutual commitment and partnership to respond to this crisis. So, 
they are indeed abiding by their responsibility to protect and work together, and the 
formulation of the EU Turkey deal proves the EU stepped in to help. However, in the 
same fashion it seems that by the standards of the R2P mandate, States are encouraged ‘to 
meet their obligations relating to the responsibility to protect [which] could entail 
confidential or public suasion, education, training and/or assistance19.’ This suggests that 
it is ok for the EU to determine how and in what ways they might want to strike a deal 
with another country based on its own motives and agenda. This is a dangerous privilege, 
because this opens the door for States to lie or cheat one another out of a deal by only 
upholding part or none of it at all. The legitimacy of state power and state credibility is 
lost under R2P. It gives the EU permission to therefore strategically act as a rational-actor 
for the purposes of its own interest in a coercive way, which allows for it to be the 
subliminal meaning of the EU’s pronounced goal to save the lives of refugees. 
 As the Secretary General report states, “…when messages are reinforced by 
parallel and consistent Member State diplomacy, they will be more persuasive. Dialogue 
often achieves more than grandstanding, in part because it can provide parties with 
greater insight into each other’s motivations and intentions (para. 30).” What this means 
for the EU and its deal with Turkey is that the five main stipulations in this deal better be 
upheld, because otherwise one or both parties will lose its credibility and jeopardize its 
capability of keeping positive relations open between one another. The EU-Turkey 
agreement signed on 18 March, 2016 manifested five main points, which state that 
                                                            
19 See Appendix 3, 6. para. 30, p.15 
31 
 
Turkey would agree to taking in the returned asylum seekers who illegally traveled 
through Turkey to the EU in exchange for around €6 billion in aid, there would be visa 
liberalization of Turkish citizens, negotiations revisited for Turkish accession into the EU, 
about €2-3 billion toward funding projects to improve lives of refugees in host 
communities in Turkey, and also the deal that the EU would provide resettlement of one 
Syrian refugee from Turkey for each Syrian that is returned to Turkey of up to 72,000 
legal entries of such EU accepted Syrians (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Just recently, 
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan threatened to end the EU Turkey deal: “Now 
they say readmission. What readmission? Forget about it," he said. "You don't let my 
minister into the Netherlands. You revoke the landing rights of my foreign minister. You 
prevent [us] holding meetings at the General Consulate building, which is my land. But 
after that you'd expect us to do this [re-admit migrants]. That's not going to happen (BBC 
News, 2017).” BBC stressed the concerns of Erdogan by mentioning that there was a 
’Broken Promise’ and they continued by restating three of the five main points of the EU 
Turkey deal, one of which Erdogan believed was not being upheld: 
‘The migrant deal, signed in March 2016, saw Turkey promised aid, visa-free travel for 
its nationals and accelerated EU membership talks in return for its help in reducing the 
flow of migrants crossing to Europe.’ 
 
‘The number of migrants reaching Greece by sea dropped sharply after the deal was 
reached, and Turkey's continued co-operation with the EU is regarded as crucial in 
managing the mass arrival of migrants fleeing war and poverty in Africa and the Middle 
East.’ 
  
 ‘President Erdogan said the EU had broken its promise of granting visa-free travel to 
  Turks.’ 
 (BBC News, 2017) 
 
 What I conclude from this and from the Responsibility to Protect framework is 
that there is a lack of legitimacy. The mandate here is flexible and somewhat up for 
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interpretation, so much so that States have leeway to make deals, change them or not 
uphold them at all. Deals made under this framework are dowsed in power games and 
self-interest, which is exactly what has been happening between the EU and Turkey. The 
EU set up the game in their own interest and used forms of veiled bribery in the deal to 
make sure Turkey kept the majority of refugees on their side of the Mediterranean. There 
are many other reasons and arguments that could be made by this example, but the key 
here is that the EU, under R2P, clearly made the EU Turkey deal with its own interest in 
mind.  
The EU, however, still upheld its responsibility to protect because quite frankly it 
had to; the refugee crisis was and still is directly affecting them. The EU also upheld its 
responsibility to help Turkey because it is very much encouraged under the R2P mandate 
to help other States that feel they have less of a capacity to protect20. Yet most assuredly, 
the EU responded because it is mandatory to do so when it regards refugees and their 
livelihood, specifically dealing with countries that signed the 1951 Geneva Convention. 
This gives reason to believe that the EU under the EU Turkey deal using the framework 
of R2P acted out of necessity for the protection of refugees but also out of a mandated 
response to protect by being in the UN and yet for its own interest to secure its borders 
and hold off refugees from crossing into the EU who cross the Mediterranean from 
Turkey.   
 
4.2 1951 Geneva Convention 
This convention was the first to consolidate all other forms of aid and responses to 
refugees, providing the rights of refugees and determining who exactly a refugee is by 
                                                            
20 See Appendix 3, 6. para. 29 
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law. From Article I in this Convention, the term refugee ‘is someone who is unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion21.’ The laws within the 1951 Refugee [Geneva] Convention 
are very straightforward. Each article dictates the procedures that the ‘Contracting State’, 
in this case the supranational body of the EU along side national state of The Republic of 
Turkey, should follow when responding to a refugee crisis. The issue of contempt here is 
that when looking at this mandate, both the EU and Turkey are following the guidelines 
of most, if not all of the articles. The EU and Turkey also upheld the fundamental 
principles that are underpinning this protocol, i.e. non-discrimination, non-penalization 
and non-refoulement.22 So, then what is the problem here? How is it possible that aside 
from seemingly not taking into account refugees’ personal situations that these countries, 
specifically the EU, are not necessarily following the Geneva Convention’s protocol? 
Two things stand out to be problematic in the EU’s response to the refugee death 
toll that might be explained under the Geneva Convention: 1) the rights of illegal 
refugees are being partly neglected, and 2) there is an issue with non-refoulement. 
Following the EU Turkey JAP implemented on 29 November 2015, it was stated on 18 
March 2016 that the foundational aim of this agreement was (and arguably still is) ‘to end 
the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU in full compliance with EU and 
international standards’ not to explicitly lower the death toll of migrants.23 Furthermore, 
                                                            
21 See Appendix3, 5. p.3 
 
 
22 See Appendix 3, 5. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, p.5 
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as was mentioned recently in February 2017 at the Malta Summit that a current aim is to 
stop smuggling—one of the most if not the biggest methods of illegal travel into the EU. 
Clearly it is obvious that even after several years of tackling this issue of irregular 
migration, migrants and refugees still come. So, in terms of the EU Turkey agreement, 
the two aforementioned issues come out of this aim, which shows that this aim is 
misguided because of the fact that refugees are still crossing illegally. Later the data will 
show that in certain routes this has increased over time.  
The EU did indeed respond in the beginning very openly to accepting refugees. In 
time more concerns and disdain were brought about, perhaps from a point of 
misunderstanding or due to a lack of patience or time to accept refugees, including those 
who crossed illegally. It is true that the numbers of refugees, entering mostly in only 
several countries of the EU put a strain on resources and actions to respond. However, 
could it be that the thought of limited resources to respond and massive waves of illegal 
refugees caused an underlying distaste and lack of personalized evaluations for refugees, 
thus neglecting their rights to fair treatment under the Geneva Convention? Basic rights 
include: ‘rights to the courts, to primary education, to work and the provision for 
documentation including a refugee travel document in passport form. …The Convention 
[further] stipulates that, subject to specific exceptions, refugees should not be penalized 
for their illegal entry or stay. This recognizes that the seeking of asylum can require 
refugees to breach immigration rules.24’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
23 See Appendix 3, 7. Commission Staff Working Document: 2016 Communication on EU 
Enlargement Policy p.4 
 
24 See Appendix 3, 5. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees p.3 
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So, why is it that refugees are told under the EU Turkey deal to stay in Turkey 
other than for the benefit firstly of the EU and then for Turkey in regards to receiving 
money and bribery partly for renegotiation of their entrance into the EU? And why is it 
ok for the EU Turkey deal to somewhat circumvent the law of non-refoulement by stating 
in the agreement that for up to 72,000 refugees the EU will send back one illegal refugee 
in trade for a legal one from Turkey? In addition to this, why is it that burden sharing is 
so much of an issue that even illegal refugees cannot be provided the basic rights to live a 
decent life once they reach the EU if they survive their journey across the sea? Whether 
there are in fact enough resources, land and space for all refugees to be dispersed and 
properly treated, it is understandable that a solution to fair treatment takes time. But, the 
issue of importance stems from the question of why refugees have to take illegal 
measures to cross into the EU in the first place.  
If refugees are still afforded basic rights (as they should be) and if it is mandatory 
for countries under the Geneva Convention to accept all refugees, then hypothetically 
speaking, why is there even a law in the first place? Also, why is there a more ‘goods and 
services’ depiction of refugees? Where is the morale that recognizes that all humans are 
humans? Every human facing persecution in their home country should be openly 
provided entry to another country for safety. Perhaps if there was no status of legality, 
less deaths would occur; but admittedly, this is too much of a utopian perspective, one 
that requires the expectation that all humans act and even make policies in response to 
crises with the intentions of having good will and decent morale. To shed light on how 
this directly relates to the individualistic-institutional perspective in the EU Turkey deal, 
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it is worthwhile to explore the psychological perception of policy making and reasoning 
based in the thought processes of lowering the death toll of the mass groups of refugees.  
 
4.3 Psychophysical & Psychological Explanation 
 Once more, the major profits of this EU-Turkey deal are threefold: 1) EU-Eastern 
Mediterranean border control has increased and led to lower migration across its 
borders—legal and illegal; 2) The death toll of migrants has decreased in this specific 
region as a result; 3) Turkey now benefits monetarily from financial support by the EU. 
Therefore, all outcomes make the EU on an institutional level look helpful and secure to 
its citizens and make it seem like this deal is working. Subsequently, the EU is comprised 
of individual MEPs and lawmakers who do in fact have moral compasses; so if assuming 
correctly, these policy-makers most likely out of the goodness of their hearts would 
probably not want any refugees to die. This calls for a brief but necessary explanation of 
how psychological understanding or lack thereof of mass death affects policy-makers’ 
thought processes regarding in this specific case, how they may have developed the 
purpose, plan of action and benefit scheme of the EU-Turkey deal. Stalin once said, “a 
single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic,” and in light of this statement, a 
psychological and legal study on the value of human lives, conducted by Goodman, 
Jinks, Slovic, et.al from NYU School of Law, reveal a similar view:  
“Our cognitive and perceptual systems seem designed to sensitize us to small changes in 
our environment, possibly at the expense of making us less able to detect and respond to 
large changes. As the psychophysical research indicates, constant increases in the 
physical magnitude of a stimulus typically evoke smaller and smaller changes in 
response. Applying this principle to the valuing of human life suggests that a form of 
psychophysical numbing may result from our inability to appreciate losses of life as they 
become larger…”  
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“The […] importance of saving one life is great when it is the first, or only, life saved but 
diminishes marginally as the total number of lives saved increases. Thus, psychologically, 
the importance of saving one life is diminished against the background of a larger 
threat— we will likely not “feel” much difference, nor value the difference, between 
saving 87 lives and saving 88.” (129). 
 
Naturally no one wants anyone else to suffer, let alone die, but based on this study 
people lose the ability to cognitively quantify and still feel connected to a mass amount of 
deaths. This being said, we can assume that it becomes a bit easier for policy makers who 
have not felt a personal connection to the mass amounts of refugee deaths to morally 
justify the implementation of policies that covertly have more of the EU’s interest in 
mind, selfishly justifying that this EU Turkey deal is then also providing its citizens 
[border] security and safety—theoretically giving them, EU citizens, a greater value than 
the loss of refugee lives. Policies like the EU-Turkey deal continue to be conceived based 
on premises where the EU can reap benefits such as the three aforementioned profits 
from the deal.  
What should be recognized is simply the fact that the EU used its supranational 
power and influence to extend its borders across the Mediterranean in order to retain its 
power and border security, instilling this individualized and also institutionalized 
perception of safety to its citizens and member states. Factors such as resource 
availability and economic feasibility among member states is of course of concern when 
thinking about border security and refugee acceptance, so it in one way makes sense for 
the EU to reach out to the countries from where the refugees are departing in order to 
create stability and security there first. However, policies and deals like these from the 
EU are not rightly benefitting the refugees and saving lives, particularly the lives of those 
who are still trying to cross the borders of the EU illegally.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 I have addressed several points outlined and explained regarding the EU’s role in 
the EU Turkey deal on the truth about lowering the refugee death toll. It is with this data 
and the limitations provided within that one can ultimately conclude that there was 
sidestepping of the EU within this deal. From blaming bad weather conditions for the 
deaths of refugees to the increase in deaths since the deal’s implementation, it is evident 
that the EU has failed in preventing and lowering the death toll overall, pointing blame 
rather than solving the issue.  
 It cannot be missed however that on the contrary, the EU has in fact lowered the 
death toll in the specific area of the Eastern Mediterranean route since the deal took 
affect. The data from the transit of refugees across the Eastern Mediterranean Route from 
Turkey shows the positive correlation between the decrease in illegal migration and the 
decrease in the refugee death toll from January in 2016 and 201725. They also have 
succeeded in upholding their end of the deal such as supplying Turkey with monetary 
support and the like. In figure 1, one can see that the ratio of refugee crossings in May 
and June of 2016 on the Eastern route has decreased as did the number of deaths, but the 
ratio of this is much closer to even. With low number of crossings comes low number of 
deaths; that is obvious.  
                                                            
25 See Appendix 1, Figure 1; See Appendix 2, Table 1 
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 Regarding the Central Mediterranean route, there has been an increase in the 
number of crossings (those migrants from the Eastern route migrating to the Central 
route) and thus also an increase in deaths. When comparing ratios, actually the EU 
Turkey deal did not evenly decrease the number of refugee deaths. So again, this leads us 
to several conundrums: Is the deal to lower refugee deaths conditional—to only save 
lives in that area covered by the deal or to save refugee lives in total? And, if the EU 
technically upheld saving lives in the Eastern Mediterranean route under the EU Turkey 
deal, does that mean that morally and factually, the EU (and Turkey) did its job rightly, 
under the neo-institutional framework and regarding the normative aims by which they 
were examined? 
The question today is would a policy like the EU-Turkey deal work for North 
African countries? Would another deal like this actually focus on EU border control and 
saving refugees’ lives? If not, then is this not undermining the policies dictated under the 
1951 Refugee Convention to treat migrants based on their individual circumstances 
(MEDMIG, 2017)? Under the Partnership Framework, methods of departure could 
perhaps be more thought out, safer and more feasible in general for migrants to make sure 
they already have proper documents together before traveling to the EU. Of course, 
resources, safety and cost of transportation would have to be thought over and determined 
by the EU and the cooperating countries first. This means that this would be a massive 
project, which very well might not be viable if proposed due to time constraints. 
Furthermore, when reviewing practical aspects regarding the cooperation of North 
African countries, the implementation of such a deal would possibly have limited 
capacity of these countries to evenly respond (Collett, 2017). 
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Through the evaluation of the EU-Turkey JAP and the role of the EU within it, I 
conclude that this particular deal did set a precedent for a similar deal to be struck 
between North African countries and Europe. Failures I highlighted in this research were 
evaluated and ultimately showed that through neo-institutionalism, the R2P and Geneva 
Convention, from an individual or institutional level, the morale of rational-actors may or 
may not be well intended, but technically it’s the response to the humanitarian crisis that 
counts.  
I hypothesized three claims in order to determine whether there was a (moral and 
normative) failure by the EU and, they turned out to be true. I evaluated and assessed the 
EU under the EU-Turkey deal to have these characteristics: 1) The EU acts in its own 
self-interest; 2) The EU policy makers are less at fault rather than the EU as a greater 
institution for making a strategic deal with Turkey—one that makes lowering the death 
toll of refugees less of a priority; 3) The EU upholds the main points of the EU Turkey 
JAP superficially, not fully solving the issue by neglecting the root causes of mass 
refugee deaths in the Mediterranean sea specifically. 
In conclusion, I determined that the normative aims and supporting documents 
only prove that there may in fact be moral issues and selfish intentions behind the actions 
of the EU to conceive and implement the EU Turkey deal, but this standing on its own 
does not mean much as evidence. So when adding in the quantitative data, I found that 
there were rerouted refugees and increase in deaths, which now gives more credibility to 
the skepticism of the moral intensions of the EU rightly lowering the death toll under the 
EU Turkey JAP. The issue with this normative and theoretical approach however is that 
the outcome and conclusion can always be left up for interpretation. What can be taken 
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out of this research and what makes this research pertinent to today’s discourse are the 
concepts of connecting the individual to the institution by infusion, thus gaining more 
balanced perceptions of the issues (and deaths) people face in order to make macro-level 
humanistic and yet still politically strategic policies within the world polity, world society 
and the international community. How can we connect to mass deaths, solve the root 
issue of these deaths from an international distance, and make further partnerships and 
policies in the future that set us all up for an individual promised chance at life and an 
institutional strategy for political success? These are the questions we should ask 
ourselves next. 
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 APPENDIX 1: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: EU-TURKEY STATEMENT IMPLEMENTATION EFFECT 
 
“In 2016, 434 migrant deaths were recorded on the Eastern Mediterranean route, a 
decrease of 46 per cent compared to the 806 recorded in 2015. This is likely linked to the 
79 per cent decrease in Mediterranean arrivals to Greece from Turkey from 2016 to 2015. 
Arrivals fell rapidly following the implementation of the European Union–Turkey 
announcement in late March 2016,11 as did the number of migrant deaths on water; 
indeed, 83 per cent of migrant deaths recorded on this route in 2016 took place before the 
agreement was implemented (p.3-4).”   
 
Reference: GMDAC, 2016 
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Figure 2:	  DETECTED	  IRREGULAR	  BORDER	  CROSSINGS	  BY	  ROUTE,	  2008-­‐2015  	  
	  
Note: This encompasses land and sea crossings. 
 
Reference: Katsiaficas, 2016 
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Figure 3: DETECTION OF IRREGULAR BORDER CROSSINGS BY 
NATIONALITY  
  
Commission Graph 4: Irregular arrivals from Turkey to Greece by nationalities (i.e. 
Syrians, Afghanis and Iraqis) - September 2015 to January 2016 – Source: Frontex 
FRAN data (2015) and JORA data (January 2016) as of 8 February 2016. JORA data are 
preliminary operational data that are subject to change. 
 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_state_of_play_20160210_annex_01_en.pdf  
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Figure 4: MIGRATN DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN 
 
 
“Figure 3 indicates the deaths and disappearances by month on each Mediterranean route. 
Compared to other routes, death while attempting to cross the Central Mediterranean 
occurs at disproportionately high levels to the number of people attempting the crossing. 
Since 2014, 17 of every 20 migrant deaths in the Mediterranean have occurred on the 
Central Mediterranean route, which accounts for just over a quarter of arrivals during the 
same period (p.1).”  
 
GMDAC. Data Briefing Series Issue No. 3. Available at: 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/gmdac_data_briefing_series_issue3.pdf  
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APPENDIX 2: TABLE  
 
Table 1: TOTAL NUMBER OF ARRIVALS & DEATHS IN MEDITERRANEAN 
SEA  
 
 
Reference: IOM 2017(1d). 
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